The collapse of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 led to the challenges of creating and then maintaining a stable, safe, and secure environment for the people of that nation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) failure to organize and establish the unity of command and unity of purpose needed to implement under an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has resulted in the ISAFs inability to gain and maintain security, prevent a resurgence of the Taliban, and develop an effective infrastructure development plan. This strategy research paper (SRP) examines how poor administration and organization of the political and military effort in Afghanistan has resulted in a lack of unity of command and unity of purpose, which has created an unstable political and military environment and an ineffective Afghan government. This SRP concludes with eleven recommendations to better organize NATO's political and military effort in order for the NATO mission to succeed in Afghanistan.
BUREAUCRACIES AT WAR: ORGANIZING FOR STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN AFGHANISTAN
The war against terrorism will only be won if we have the people with us.
There is no other way 1 --Hamid Karzai
Background
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was a post 9/11response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 2 The United States identified Osama bin
Laden and his al Qaeda network as being responsible for the attacks. Since bin Laden and his collaborators had established a significant presence in Afghanistan and had developed close ties to the Taliban leadership, the United States sought their extradition. 3 The Taliban ignored international calls to hand over Osama bin Laden, and this refusal led to the October 2001, invasion of Afghanistan by a US-led Coalition (Operation Enduring Freedom/OEF) against the Taliban and al Qaeda. 4 To support the invasion, Central Command (CENTCOM) deployed a Combined The success of these units is notable but, unifying the operational efforts of these multiple service components and their coalition partners was very difficult, as evidenced in Operation ANACONDA in March 2002. 6 To improve command and control USCENTCOM established the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) as the joint operational level headquarters for Afghanistan, commanded by a three star U.S. general.
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As an outcome of the 2001 United Nations-led Bonn Conference, the Afghan tribal parties reached agreement on an interim governing structure for the country in December 2001, pending the establishment of a permanent, broad-based, representative, and democratically elected government. 8 The Bonn agreement also set up the process for determining structure of the Afghan government, drafting a new constitution, and holding presidential and parliamentary elections.
9
Anticipating that considerable international support would be required to assist with reconstruction and maintaining stability, the United Nations Security Council Recognizing the inadequacy of this approach, the Taliban united many of the formerly independent groups of fighters under a common cause with the objective of driving "the infidels" out of Afghanistan. The Taliban's more effective organization has restored confidence in its ability to rise again to power and rule the country. 27 Their renewed unity of effort also enabled the group to intimidate the populace effectively.
The Taliban use night letters (letters delivered at night to intimidate village elders, government officials, and Afghan citizens) mullahs, radio, television and the internet to spread their messages. During their rule of Afghanistan, they outlawed television. But now they use this technology adeptly to disseminate videos of their be-heading of Afghans who work with ISAF or the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA). 28 Another objective of an insurgency is to decrease international support for the government. The Taliban is organized effectively to conduct "information warfare"
against ISAF and the wider international community. 29 They use propaganda, contact with local leaders, and visible local assistance to the local population to influence the populace. 30 Their messages support its objectives and are effective in countering ISAF and IRoA messages. 31 Taliban actions are also aimed at influencing, national and international audiences as well as national and international media. 32 The Taliban broadcast their messages in the media within 60 minutes of a major event. This is considerably faster than ISAF can counter the Taliban's messages, because ISAF leaders are required to investigate, confirm, and gain approval for their messages through the chain of command before they can release press statements.
In 2006, the Taliban staged a dramatic comeback by relying on the insurgent tactics that have been perfected with deadly efficiency in Iraq. 33 The Taliban Additionally, a United Nations report in September 2007, revealed that a bumper poppy crop produced 6,100 metric tons of opium, a 50 percent increase over the previous year. 35 The funds derived from the drug trade have enabled the Taliban to attract fighters who are paid three times as much as the IRoA pays a member of the ANSF. Drug money is also being used to pay suicide bomber's families approximately $9,000 USD, so an increasing number of people are willing to martyr themselves. 36 With little improvement in the economy, a high unemployment rate, and continuing pressure from Pakistan and Iran on the refugee camps, the incentive for a potential suicide bomber to take money for a suicide attack in order to feed his family is greater than ever. 37 Thus, the Taliban have shown the flexibility to adapt and change their ways and means to win. They appeal to the fundamental Islamic beliefs when it enables them to inspire their uneducated fighters, but the key factor in their recent success has been their adaptation to ISAFs tactics. 38 The Taliban has transformed from operating as guerilla fighters in the mountains to establishing safe havens, controlling lines of communication, occupying villages, and conducting assassinations and suicide attacks in the population centers.
Time has also been a significant factor in the Taliban's resurgence by providing them the opportunity to reorganize and adapt to NATO and ISAF operations. 39 The longer the conflict drags on, the more chance they have to "sell" their message or ideology, and the greater possibility it will have of succeed. The Taliban say, "ISAF has got the watch, but we have got the time." 40 Perhaps their greatest asymmetric advantage, and the technique most at odds with our own war fighting principles, is the Taliban's ability to withdraw and blend into the populace. 41 Unlike its host nation forces and her allies, the enemy wears no uniform, has no standard equipment, and does not require any personal accountability.
Hidden in plain sight, they rely on their greatest ally, time, and waits for the next opportunity to take up arms. Thus these insurgent fighters can be best described as combatant civilians. Taliban tours only end in death, which the Taliban believe is an entry into paradise. 43 Thus the enemy's use of extremist religious ideology offers another advantage. Its impact on an uneducated populace is significant and can prevent legitimizing the Afghan government. 44 Threats The following eleven recommendations should be pursued to improve NATO's political and military effort. They seek ways to improve organization, unity of command, and unity of purpose in NATO's efforts to build a stable Afghan nation. These changes will enable NATO to achieve a balance in its indirect and direct approaches that will neutralize and control the insurgent threat, develop effective and efficient Afghan National Security Forces, and conduct nation-building that supports the populace, Afghanistan is not exclusively a peacekeeping operation or a nation-building operation.
NATO is facing an active insurgency that requires a balanced direct and indirect approach to neutralize the insurgents and conduct nation building.
Further, many contributing nations deployed in Afghanistan are insufficiently led, equipped, and prepared to accomplish their assigned tasks. They have serious restrictive caveats to their military employment and are risk and casualty averse. In many cases these countries lack the force enablers to conduct effective COIN operations. 53 In addition, contributing nations are not familiar with or prepared to conduct security force training. And this lack of internal defense is inhibiting the development of the Afghan government infrastructure. NATO must take the lead in preparing an Afghan defense force and ensuring that effective partnerships are established with the Afghan government.
NATO must also convince the contributing countries that the top priority in conducting operations in Afghanistan is to establish security and develop the ANSF, followed seamlessly by focused village and district development programs that join the village to the province and legitimize the national government. Each contributing country must be organized and integrated into the COIN strategy consistent with their capability. No country should be placed in a situation where their capacity does not match their capability. There is a place for every contributing nation to act effectively within the COIN strategy and NATO must find it.
NATO Must Establish Unity of Command and Unity of Purpose
To be effective, the ISAF commander must command all forces in Afghanistan.
All contributing countries must recognize this authority and adhere to one established chain of command. Units in Afghanistan must operate under a single mandate. Inside Afghanistan, the regional commands should be reconfigured and reduced to RC North and East and RC South and West. Command tours must be lengthened to one year and the command responsibility should remain within one country. There must be a continuity of operations plan for incoming rotations to ensure continuity, and pre-mission training must be focused on one strategy and oriented to the incoming units' area of responsibility. It is critical that incoming units understand their mission, where they will be located and that their pre-mission training supports a single strategy. A successful political-military strategy will establish a COIN force design and COIN force location; it will specify needed resources to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The strategy must neutralize and control the insurgents by separating them from the populace. The reconstruction and development plan should be a bottom-up village to district plan that strengthens the social structure. This approach will connect the PRT and the provincial Afghan provincial civil leadership with the village civil leadership. With increased security in the village and districts, the economy will improve, thereby making more resources available for reconstruction and more money in local Afghan hands.
NATO Must Develop Efficient and Effective Afghan Security Forces
One of NATO's imperatives is to ensure that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is properly organized, trained, equipped, and capable of conducting operations.
Although NATO has developed ANSF, its effectiveness is limited due to lack of funding, equipment, pay problems, retention problems, and corruption. The poor security situation is directly related to the poor quality of ANSF. According to ISAF Commander General David McKiernan, the violence in Afghanistan was at least 30% higher in September 2008 than in September 2007. 57 The Afghan populace is less secure today than it was in 2005. This is due largely to the violence surrounding the insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns and to the inability of security forces to restrain the Taliban. The Afghan security institutions have increased their operational capacity and have trained more personnel, but they have also had problems with retention, staff effectiveness, corruption, and general oversight. 58 The lack of effective and efficient security forces has a serious impact on the legitimacy of the Afghan government. Afghans are losing trust in their government because of an escalation in violence. Public expectations are not being met and conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated in all key areas targeted for development.
Traditional, informal judicial structures continue to fill the gap for many Afghans.
Meanwhile, the formal justice sector remains inaccessible and corrupt. It is unable to confront religious extremism, adjudicate land disputes, unravel criminal networks, or protect the rights of citizens.
59
The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) are in desperate need of more personnel, weapons, vehicles, artillery, and air assets.
Second-hand donated military equipment sits in Europe because NATO cannot find $7 million dollars to pay for its transportation to Afghanistan. 60 ISAF units are doing an excellent job training the ANSF, but its lack of funding has a negative effect on its overall quality and long-term effectiveness. Further, due to national caveats, many allied trainers cannot accompany their Afghan units in the field to provide advice, assistance, and support. Lastly, inadequate Afghan government systems at the provincial, district, and village level must be fixed. In their place, militia commanders and corrupt village elders have filled the void, undermining governance and basic rights. 62 To remedy this problem, civil servants require training in public administration and should be recruited from the local population. Elected officials must also be advised, assisted, and trained in public administration. This versatile counterinsurgent force can also focus on the enemy by operating from a secure base and expand security outwardly, the so-called oil spot approach.
NATO Must Commit to
The populace then perceives the base as a place of support. More importantly, it is a place from which the Afghan government can launch efforts and leverage resources to implement its reconstruction and development plan that connects villages to district and provincial centers, that legitimizes the Afghan government, and that helps set the conditions for on-going security and stability.
NATO Must Improve Its Strategic Communications
Recognizing that people are the strategic center of gravity in a COIN environment and the insurgents' critical vulnerability, it is important that an aggressive information operations and public affairs plan is developed to influence all strata of society. Achieving this starts with something as simple as base location, force placement, and task organization. Getting these fundamentals right, the first time (and being prepared to adjust when a miscalculation occurs) is critical for achieving the desired effect on the enemy, for positively influencing the populace, and for legitimizing the government.
The Taliban is more effective at information warfare than NATO and ISAF because they are decentralized and are in the villages to influence the populace. Lastly, Iran is a key factor. It seeks to defy U.S. influence by supporting the Taliban with weapons and bomb-making materials. 67 Iran's dominance in western
Afghanistan is due to a lack of an Afghan political identity in western Afghanistan. There is a right way and a wrong way to approach the gaining of security and reconstruction of the Afghan social culture and institutional structures. In the process of rebuilding the Afghan government NATO must be careful not to return to the days of armed warlords and militias. NATO must avoid getting tied down to the tribal systems.
They are too complicated and too numerous and risk creating tribal and ethnic rivalries that could result in civil war. 70 Historically, warlords and strongmen have been an obstacle to good governance and justice in Afghanistan. To avoid the fragmentation of authority and a weak central government, NATO must ensure the gaining of security is done in the context of an Afghan government constructed by balancing the roles and missions of the police and military with civilian leaders. 71 As discussed earlier, the development of a bottom-up civil defense plan that trains, organizes, and equips the security forces is the most viable option. Working in conjunction with village elders, young men would be hired to work as auxiliary police at the village level and national police at district and provincial level. The connecting of village elders, district and provincial leaders, and the layering of police security and law enforcement duties will facilitate security within the vast territory that constitutes a province. NATO must not create Afghan security forces along western constructs, but instead, must allow the Afghans to use the strength of its tribal system to create Afghan security forces that serve the needs of the people, work towards the common good, and promote nationalism over tribalism.
Another area NATO must provide oversight and work closely with the Afghan government at all levels is the Afghan reconciliation plan. This plan is called "The Program Takhim-E Solh," which translates to "Strengthening Peace Program." The Afghan reconciliation program has produced mixed results due to the fluctuating security environment, coalition forces misrepresenting the reconciliation program, not letting the Afghans take the lead, and NATO confusing reconciliation with bargaining and negotiations. 72 All counterinsurgency strategies have a reconciliation program. These programs are prudent, demonstrate a democratic process to resolving security issues, and can serve as an effective political tool in gaining the support of the populace. The intent of the program is to offer insurgents, former insurgents and other supporters the opportunity to renounce violence and peacefully join with the government.
Reconciliation programs are not designed to be a "get out of jail free card" or to bargain or negotiate with the insurgents. Reconciliation requires capitulation, assimilation, and denouncing insurgent ideology. Bargaining and negotiating, however, does not require capitulation, assimilation, and denouncing of insurgent ideology, and is a dangerous approach with serious stability repercussions.
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To have an effective reconciliation program, NATO must ensure the following conditions are met. First, reconciliation is an issue the Afghan government leads.
Second, there must be an effective civil government and Afghan National Security
Forces at the village, district, and provincial level to administer the program. Third, there must be an effective reconciliation program strategic communications plan.
Fourth, reconciliation must be part of a balanced COIN strategy that has created an environment that has the support of the populace and is inhospitable to the insurgent.
Fifth, the reconciliation plan must be coordinated with Pakistan to influence cross border insurgents. NATO cannot navigate the maze of Afghanistan's ethnic politics. Only the Afghans can do this effectively, but even they are limited due to a lack of security and a government that is perceived as weaker than the Taliban. NATO must not allow a reconciliation program to diverge into bargaining and negotiating with the Taliban. The reconciliation program must be closely monitored and judiciously administered until the conditions mentioned above are met. 74 Poppy production is one of the most pressing domestic issues in Afghanistan.
Afghan government officials recognize that the drug trade finances the Taliban insurgency, which then hinders the stability and security of many provinces.
Afghanistan's enormous poppy production also casts the country as narco-state. 75 Directly destroying the sprawling poppy crop seems to be an obvious solution.
Successful poppy eradication, however, must be executed in secure locations with a sound security situation. Additionally, replacement crops and financial compensation are crucial components of the eradication process. Farmers rely on their crops to earn a living and feed their families and tribes; destruction of poppy without compensating the farmers for their loss will enable the Taliban to recruit many of these farmers to become fighters. 76 The Taliban have successfully organized resistance towards Afghan government and coalition poppy eradication in areas where they have a strong presence and freedom of movement. This resistance has caused Afghan casualties, and provided a public relations victory for the enemy thereby boosting their recruiting in the area.
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Poppy eradication also must be applied fairly and uniformly. Otherwise the Taliban will exploit perceptions of tribal favoritism. Poppy eradication should be conducted exclusively by the Afghan government. Poppy eradication, however, must be a lower priority than gaining security, and neutralizing and controlling the insurgency.
It cannot be accomplished until the Afghan government promotes an alternative crop or develops an economic compensation plan for the farmers. NATO must develop a standard assessment tool to determine progress. It is very difficult to develop a mathematical formula to determine success in a COIN environment. 80 Measuring effectiveness in a COIN environment requires conditionsand event-based assessments that determine whether an area has a permissive or nonpermissive security environment. The assessment tool combines standard questions with personal judgments and intuition; it should be based on the perspectives of the assessment team members that have had long-term presence in the area and contact with the populace. 81 The assessment tool must be a NATO approved report to standardize data on the status of security and nation-building in every province, district, and village. All ISAF 
Conclusion
Afghanistan is important because it could once again become a safe haven for al Qaeda, remains at the intersection of global energy and trade crossroads, and is situated in a strategically important area in Southwest Asia. To the east lies Pakistan, the second largest Islamic nation in the world armed with nuclear weapons. To the west is Iran, a potential nuclear threat. This "neighborhood" is definitely a strategic interest to the West. NATO can ill afford any other outcome than success in Afghanistan. 83 To achieve success NATO must mandate a new approach in Afghanistan and link operations directly to the strategic goal of building a viable government.
The Taliban is adapting to the post-invasion environment and changing its organization and tactics while NATO remains bounded by an ineffective command construct that lacks strategic direction and unity of command and unity of purpose. To correct this situation, NATO must have full authority over all operations in Afghanistan and put together a strategy that enables the Afghan government to win. 84 If NATO is politically weak, its military effort is ineffective and its actions create an alliance between the Taliban and the populace; NATO will lose.
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To date, it is NATO's lack of a comprehensive strategy in Afghanistan has prevented the nation's stability. NATO has not conducted successful security operations and nation-building. Indeed, the Taliban has had a resurgence in Afghanistan. Countering these negative trends requires a more focused effort. NATO inherited a less than ideal situation in Afghanistan from the United States, but NATO is now in charge. NATO must fix the problems associated with a lack of unity of command and a lack of unity of purpose. Clearly, the United States and other nations are contributing to the fracture in unity of command and unity purpose. So it must work with NATO to correct this problem before all fail in Afghanistan.
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